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THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF
AFRICA’S SLAVE TRADES∗
Nathan Nunn
Can part of Africa’s current underdevelopment be explained by its slave trades? To
explore this question, I use data from shipping records and historical documents report-
ing slave ethnicities to construct estimates of the number of slaves exported from each
country during Africa’s slave trades. I find a robust negative relationship between the
number of slaves exported from a country and current economic performance. To better
understand if the relationship is causal, I examine the historical evidence on selection into
the slave trades, and use instrumental variables. Together the evidence suggests that the
slave trades have had an adverse effect on economic development.
I. Introduction
Africa’s economic performance in the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury has been poor. One, often informal, explanation for Africa’s under-
development is its history of extraction, characterized by two events: the
slave trades and colonialism. Bairoch [1993, p. 8] writes that “there is no
doubt that a large number of negative structural features of the process of
economic underdevelopment have historical roots going back to European
colonization.” Manning [1990, p. 124] echoes Bairoch, but focuses on the
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slave trades, writing: “Slavery was corruption: it involved theft, bribery,
and exercise of brute force as well as ruses. Slavery thus may be seen as one
source of precolonial origins for modern corruption.”
Recent empirical studies suggest that Africa’s history can explain part
of its current underdevelopment. These studies focus on the link between
countries’ colonial experience and current economic development [Bertocchi
and Canova, 2002; Englebert, 2000a,b; Grier, 1999; Lange, 2004; Acemoglu
et al., 2001, 2002]. However, the other important event in Africa’s history,
its slave trades, has yet to be examined empirically. There are reasons to
expect that the slave trades may be at least as important as official colonial
rule for Africa’s development. For a period of nearly 500 years, from 1400
to 1900, the African continent simultaneously experienced four slave trades.
By comparison, official colonial rule lasted from 1885 to about 1960, a total
of approximately 75 years.
This paper provides the first empirical examination of the importance of
Africa’s slave trades in shaping subsequent economic development. In doing
this, I construct measures of the number of slaves exported from each coun-
try in Africa, in each century between 1400 and 1900. The estimates are
constructed by combining data from ship records on the number of slaves
shipped from each African port or region with data from a variety of histor-
ical documents that report the ethnic identities of slaves that were shipped
from Africa. I find a robust negative relationship between the number of
slaves exported from each country and subsequent economic performance.
The African countries that are the poorest today are the ones from which
the most slaves were taken.
This finding cannot be taken as conclusive evidence that the slave trades
caused differences in subsequent economic development. An alternative ex-
planation that is just as plausible is that countries that were initially the
most economically and socially underdeveloped selected into the slave trades,
and these countries continue to be the most underdeveloped today. In other
words, the slave trades may be correlated with unobserved country char-
acteristics, resulting in biased estimates of the effect of the slave trades on
economic development.
I pursue a number of strategies to better understand the reason behind
the relationship between slave exports and current economic performance.
First, I review the evidence from African historians on the nature of selection
into the slave trades. I also use historic data on pre-slave trade population
densities to examine whether it was the less developed parts of Africa that
selected into the slave trades. Both sources of evidence show that it was
actually the most developed areas of Africa that tended to select into the
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slave trades. I discuss the reason behind this seemingly paradoxical rela-
tionship in detail. Second, I use instruments to estimate the causal effect of
the slave trades on subsequent economic development. The instruments are
the sailing distances from each country to the nearest location of demand for
slave labor in each of the four slave trades. Like the OLS coefficients, the IV
coefficients are negative and significant, suggesting that increased extraction
during the slave trades caused worse subsequent economic performance.
I then explore the precise channel of causality underlying the relationship
between slave exports and economic development. Using historical evidence
as a guide, I examine whether the procurement of slaves through internal
warfare, raiding, and kidnapping resulted in subsequent state collapse and
ethnic fractionalization. I find that the data are consistent with these chan-
nels.
These findings complement the research of Engerman and Sokoloff [1997,
2002], which shows that slavery in the New World resulted in the evolution
of institutions that were not conducive for economic growth.1 My results
show that not only was the use of slaves detrimental for a society, but the
production of slaves, which occurred through domestic warfare, raiding, and
kidnapping, also had negative impacts on subsequent development.
The paper is structured as follows. In the following section, I provide an
description of Africa’s slave trades, providing a detailed historical overview of
the manner in which slaves were procured, and the resulting adverse effects.
In Section III, I describe the construction of the slave export figures. Section
IV documents the correlations that exist in the data, and Section V turns
to the issue of causality. In Section VI, guided by the historical evidence, I
examine the potential channels of causality. Section VII concludes.
II. Historical Background
Between 1400 and 1900, the African continent experienced four simulta-
neous slave trades. The largest and most well-known is the trans-Atlantic
slave trade where, beginning in the 15th century, slaves were shipped from
West Africa, West Central Africa and Eastern Africa to the European colonies
in the New World. The three other slave trades – the trans-Saharan, Red
Sea, and Indian Ocean slave trades – are much older and predate the trans-
Atlantic slave trade. During the trans-Saharan slave trade, slaves were taken
from south of the Saharan desert to Northern Africa. In the Red Sea slave
trade, slaves were taken from inland of the Red Sea and shipped to the
1Also see Lagerlo¨f [2005] and Mitchener and McLean [2003] for related evidence.
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Middle East and India. In the Indian Ocean slave trade, slaves were taken
from Eastern Africa and shipped either to the Middle East and India or to
plantation islands in the Indian Ocean.
A number of characteristics of Africa’s slave trades make them distinct
from previous slave trades. First, the total volume of slaves traded was
unprecedented. During the trans-Atlantic slave trade alone, approximately
12 million slaves were exported from Africa. Another 6 million were exported
in the other three slave trades. These figures do not include those who were
killed during the raids or those who died on their journey to the coast. The
total effect of the slave trades, according to calculations by Patrick Manning
[1990, p. 171], was that by 1850 Africa’s population was only half of what
it would have been had the slave trades not taken place.
Africa’s slave trades were also unique because, unlike previous slave
trades, individuals of the same or similar ethnicities enslaved one another.
This had particularly detrimental consequences, including social and eth-
nic fragmentation, political instability and a weakening of states, and the
corruption of judicial institutions.
The most common manner in which slaves were taken was through vil-
lages or states raiding one another [Lovejoy, 1994; Northrup, 1978]. Where
groups of villages had previously developed into larger scale village feder-
ations, relations between the villages tended to turn hostile [e.g., Inikori,
2000; Hubbell, 2001; Azevedo, 1982]. As a result, ties between villages were
weakened, which in turn impeded the formation of larger communities and
broader ethnic identities. Kusimba [2004, p. 66] writes that “insecurity con-
fined people within ethnic boundaries constructing spheres of interaction”.
Because of this process, the slave trades may be an important factor explain-
ing Africa’s high level of ethnic fractionalization today. This is significant
for economic development given the established relationship between eth-
nic fractionalization and long-term economic growth [Easterly and Levine,
1997].
Because of the environment of uncertainty and insecurity at the time,
individuals required weapons, such as iron knives, spears, swords or firearms,
to defend themselves. These weapons could be obtained from Europeans in
exchange for slaves, which were often obtained through local kidnappings.
This further perpetuated the slave trade and the insecurity that it caused,
which in turn further increased the need to enslave others to protect oneself
[Mahadi, 1992; Hawthorne, 1999, pp. 108–109]. Historians have named this
vicious cycle the ‘gun-slave cycle’ [e.g., Lovejoy, 2000] or the ‘iron-slave
cycle’ [e.g., Hawthorne, 2003]. The result of this vicious cycle was that
communities not only raided other communities for slaves, but also members
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of a community raided and kidnapped others within the community. Well-
documented examples come from the Balanta of modern day Guinea-Bissau,
the Minyanka of modern day Mali [Klein, 2001], and the Makua, Chikunda,
and Yao of East Central Africa [Isaacman, 1989, p. 191–192, 196; Alpers,
1969, pp. 413–414; Alpers, 1975, p. 225].
Generally, the consequence of internal conflict was increased political
instability and in many cases the collapse of pre-existing forms of govern-
ment [Lovejoy, 2000, pp. 68–70]. In 16th century Northern Senegambia,
the Portuguese slave trade was a key factor leading to the eventual dis-
integration of the Joloff Confederation, which was replaced by the much
smaller kingdoms of Waalo, Kajoor, Baol, Siin and Saalum. Further south,
in Southern Senegambia, the same pattern is observed. Prior to the slave
trades, complex state systems were in the process of evolving. However,
this evolution stagnated soon after the arrival of the Portuguese in the 15th
century [Barry, 1998, pp. 36–59]. Similar patterns of instability have also
been documented in Eastern Africa [e.g., Isaacman, 1989; Mbajedwe, 2000].
In the late 19th century, the slave trades resulted in the disintegration of
the Shambaa kingdom, Gweno kingdom, and Pare states in East Africa’s
Pangani valley [Kimambo, 1989, p. 247; Mbajedwe, 2000, p. 341–342].
The most dramatic example may be the Kongo Kingdom of West Central
Africa. As early as 1514, the kidnapping of local Kongo citizens for sale to
the Portuguese had become rampant, threatening social order and the King’s
authority. In 1526, Affonso, King of Kongo, wrote to Portugal complaining
that “there are many traders in all corners of the country. They bring ruin
to the country. Every day people are enslaved and kidnapped, even nobles,
even members of the king’s own family.” [Vansina, 1966, p. 52]. This break-
down of law and order was partly responsible for the weakening and eventual
fall of the once powerful state [Inikori, 2003]. For many of the other Bantu
speaking ethnicities, stable states also existed in earlier periods, but by the
time the slave trades were brought to an end few ancient states remained
[Colson, 1969, pp. 36–37].
Pre-existing governance structures were generally replaced by small bands
of slave raiders, controlled by an established ruler or warlord. However,
these bands were generally unable to develop into large, stable states. Col-
son [1969, p. 35] writes that “both the bands and the new states they created
retained an air of improvisation. Few band leaders were able to hand power
to a legitimate successor. Even where a band leader had become the ruler
of a state, succession remained a problem. Leadership was a personal role,
rather than an established office.”
The slave trades also contributed to political instability by causing the
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corruption of previous established legal structures. In many cases, it be-
came common to obtain slaves by falsely accusing others of witchcraft or
other crimes [Lovejoy, 2000; Northrup, 1978; Koelle, 1854]. Klein [2001, p.
59] writes that “communities began enslaving their own. Judicial penalties
that formerly had taken the form of beatings, payment of compensation
or exile, for example, were now converted to enslavement.” Often, leaders
themselves supported or even instigated this abuse of the judicial system
[Mahadi, 1992; Klein, 2001; Hawthorne, 1999, 2003]. To protect themselves
and their community from being raided, leaders often chose to pay slaves as
tribute, which were often obtained through the judicial system. Hawthorne
[1999, 2003] provides detailed studies of this process among the Cassanga of
modern day Guinea Bissau. The chief of the Cassanga used the ‘red water
ordeal’ to procure slaves and their possessions. Those accused of a crime
were forced to drink a poisonous red liquid. If they vomited, then they were
judged to be guilty. If they did not vomit, they were deemed not guilty.
However, for those that did not vomit this usually brought death by poison-
ing. Their possessions were then seized and their family members were sold
into slavery.
Evidence from research showing a relationship between a country’s his-
tory of state development and subsequent economic performance, suggests
that these effects of the slave trades may be important for current economic
development [Bockstette et al., 2002; Chanda and Putterman, 2005]. Oth-
ers have argued that Africa’s underdevelopment is a direct result of state
failure, which stems from Africa’s weak and unstable pre-colonial political
structures [Herbst, 1997, 2000]. Because Africa’s slaves trades were an im-
portant factor affecting political underdevelopment, they may be a central
reason behind Africa’s weak states today.
III. Slave Export Data
Because I am interested in examining the effects of the slave trades that
resulted because of the procurement of slaves, my measure of interest is the
total number of slaves taken from each country during the four slave trades
between 1400 and 1900.2
I use two types of data to construct the slave export estimates. The first
are data that report the total number of slaves exported from each port or re-
gion in Africa. I refer to these as shipping data. For the trans-Atlantic slave
trade, the data are from the updated version of the Trans-Atlantic Slave
2Ideally, I would also like to include people that entered into local domestic slavery.
However, the necessary data to construct these estimates do not exist.
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Trade Database constructed by Eltis et al. [1999]. The database records
information for 34,584 voyages from 1514 to 1866. The shipping data are
originally from various documents and records located around the world.
Because in most European ports, merchants were required to register their
ships and declare the volume and value of goods transported, for each ship
and voyage, typically, there exists a number of different registers and docu-
ments. In the database, 77% of the trans-Atlantic slave voyages after 1700
have shipping information from more than one source, while the average
number of sources for each voyage is six. It is estimated that the database
contains 82% of all trans-Atlantic slaving voyages ever attempted [Eltis and
Richardson, forthcoming].
Data for the early period of the Atlantic slave trade not covered by the
Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database are from Elbl [1997]. For the Indian
Ocean, Red Sea, and trans-Saharan slave trades, data are from Austen [1979,
1988, 1992]. The data are based on estimates from all available documents,
records and accounts by observers and government officials on the location
and volume of slaves exports.
With the shipping data one can calculate the number of slaves that were
shipped from each coastal country. However, this does not give an accurate
indication of where slaves were originally captured. Slaves shipped from the
ports of a coastal country may have come from a country located further
inland. To estimate the number of slaves shipped from the coast that came
from inland countries, I also use a second source of data that reports the
ethnic identity of slaves shipped from Africa. This information comes from
a variety of sources such as records of sale, slave registers, slave runaway
notices, court records, church records, and notarial documents.
There were a number of ways of identifying the ethnicity or ‘nation’
of a slave. The easiest was often by a slaves name. Slaves were often
given a Christian first name and a surname that identified their ethnicity
[e.g., Tardieu, 2001]. As well, a slave’s ethnicity could often be determined
from ethnic markings, such as cuts, scars, hairstyles, or the filing of teeth
[Karasch, 1987, pp. 4–9]. Oldendorp [1777, p. 169] writes that “the people of
all Negro nations are marked with certain cuts on the skin. As far as I have
been able to learn from the Negroes themselves, these serve to distinguish
one nation from another.”
Because slaves were legally defined as property, those engaged in the
buying and selling of slaves had a strong incentive to correctly identify the
birthplace or ‘nation’ of slaves [Wax, 1973]. Moreno Fraginals [1977, p.
190] writes that “the slave trade was the business that involved the greatest
amount of capital investment in the world during the eighteenth and nine-
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teenth centuries. And a business of this size would never have kept up a
classificatory scheme had it not been meaningful (in overall general terms,
in keeping with reality) in designating in a very precise way the merchandise
that was being traded.”
Information on the ethnicities of slaves shipped during the trans-Atlantic
slave trade come from 54 different samples, totalling 80,656 slaves, with 229
distinct ethnic designations reported. Table I summarizes information about
the samples used in the trans-Atlantic slave trade. The table reports the
location, years covered, number of slaves, and the number of ethnicities that
could be identified for each sample. Similar tables for the other three slave
trades are reported in Nunn [2007].
The ethnicity data for the Indian Ocean slave trade come from six sam-
ples, with a total of 21,048 slaves and 80 different ethnicities reported. The
data for the Red Sea slave trade are from two samples: one from Jedda,
Saudi Arabia and the other from Bombay, India. The samples provide in-
formation for 67 slaves, with 32 different reported ethnicities. For the trans-
Saharan slave trade two samples are available: one from Central Sudan and
the other from Western Sudan. The samples provide information on the
origins of 5,385 slaves, with 23 different ethnicities recorded. The shipping
data from Austen [1992] also provides additional information on which car-
avan slaves were shipped on, the city or town that the caravan originated
in, the destination of the caravan, and in some cases the ethnic identity of
the slaves being shipped.
To illustrate how I combine the ethnicity data with the shipping data to
construct my estimates I use an example, which is shown in Figure I. The
figure is a hypothetical map of the western coast of Africa with each square
representing a country.
From the shipping data, I first calculate the number of slaves shipped
from each coastal country in Africa. In this example 100,000 slaves were
shipped from Country A and 150,000 were shipped from Country B. The
problem with relying on the shipping data alone is that many of slaves
shipped from Country A may have come from Country B, which lies land-
locked behind Country A. Then, using the ethnicity data, I calculate the
ratio of slaves from each coastal country relative to any landlocked countries
located inland of the coastal country, which requires that I map ethnicities
to countries and aggregate up to the country level. In practice, this step re-
lied on a great amount of past research by African historians, linguists, and
ethnographers. The sources most heavily used are Koelle [1854], Murdock
[1959], Curtin [1969], Higman [1984], and Hall [2005].
Because ethnicities tended to be much smaller than countries, the map-
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TABLE I
Slave Ethnicity Data for the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade
Num. Num.
Location Years Ethnic. Obs. Record Type
Valencia, Spain 1482–1516 77 2,675 Crown Records
Puebla, Mexico 1540–1556 14 115 Notarial Records
Dominican Republic 1547–1591 26 22 Records of Sale
Peru 1548–1560 16 202 Records of Sale
Mexico 1549 12 80 Plantation Accounts
Peru 1560–1650 30 6,754 Notarial Records
Lima, Peru 1583–1589 15 288 Baptism Records
Colombia 1589–1607 9 19 Various Records
Mexico 1600–1699 28 102 Records of Sale
Dominican Republic 1610–1696 33 55 Government Records
Chile 1615 6 141 Sales Records
Lima, Peru 1630–1702 33 409 Parish Records
Peru (Rural) 1632 25 307 Parish Records
Lima, Peru 1640–1680 33 936 Marriage Records
Colombia 1635–1695 6 17 Slave Inventories
Guyane (French Guiana) 1690 12 69 Plantation Records
Colombia 1716–1725 33 59 Government Records
French Louisiana 1717–1769 23 223 Notarial Records
Dominican Republic 1717–1827 11 15 Government Records
South Carolina 1732–1775 35 681 Runaway Notices
Colombia 1738–1778 11 100 Various Records
Spanish Louisiana 1770–1803 79 6,615 Notarial Records
St. Dominique (Haiti) 1771–1791 25 5,413 Sugar Plantations
Bahia, Brazil 1775–1815 14 581 Slave Lists
St. Dominique (Haiti) 1778–1791 36 1,280 Coffee Plantations
Guadeloupe 1788 8 45 Newspaper Reports
St. Dominique (Haiti) 1788–1790 21 1,297 Fugitive Slave Lists
Cuba 1791–1840 59 3,093 Slave Registers
St. Dominique (Haiti) 1796–1797 56 5,632 Plantation Inventories
American Louisiana 1804–1820 62 223 Notarial Records
Salvador, Brazil 1808–1842 6 456 Records of Manumission
Trinidad 1813 100 12,460 Slave Registers
St. Lucia 1815 62 2,333 Slave Registers
Bahia, Brazil 1816–1850 27 2,666 Slave Lists
St. Kitts 1817 48 2,887 Slave Registers
Senegal 1818 17 80 Captured Slave Ship
Berbice (Guyana) 1819 66 1,127 Slave Registers
Salvador, Brazil 1819–1836 12 871 Manumission Certificates
Salvador, Brazil 1820–1835 11 1,106 Probate Records
Sierra Leone 1821–1824 68 605 Child Registers
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 1826–1837 31 772 Prison Records
Anguilla 1827 7 51 Slave Registers
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 1830–1852 190 2,921 Free Africans’ Records
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 1833–1849 35 476 Death Certificates
Salvador, Brazil 1835 13 275 Court Records
Salvador, Brazil 1838–1848 7 202 Slave Registers
St. Louis/Goree, Senegal 1843–1848 21 189 Emancipated Slaves
Bakel, Senegal 1846 16 73 Sales Records
d’Agoue´, Benin 1846–1885 11 70 Church Records
Sierra Leone 1848 132 12,425 Linguistic and British Census
Salvador, Brazil 1851–1884 8 363 Records of Manumission
Salvador, Brazil 1852–1888 7 269 Slave Registers
Cape Verde 1856 32 314 Slave Census
Kikoneh Island, Sierra Leone 1896–1897 11 185 Fugitive Slave Records
9
AFRICA
Atlantic
Ocean
Country A Country B
Country C
Country D
Country E
100, 000 ⇐
250, 000 ⇐
↑
N
FIGURE I
An artificial map of the west coast of Africa
ping of ethnicities into countries generally is not problematic. This is il-
lustrated in Figure II, which shows African ethnicities based on Murdock’s
[1959] classification, as well as modern political boundaries. From the figure
it is apparent that ethnicities are much smaller than modern boundaries,
and therefore ethnicities generally map cleanly into one country.3
Assume that the ratio of slaves from Country A relative to Country B
is 4 to 1. This ratio suggests that 20% of the slaves shipped from Country
A were actually from Country B. Therefore, the estimated number of slaves
from Country B is 20,000 and from Country A is 80,000. Assume that the
ratio of slaves from Country C to D to E is 3 to 1 to 1. The same proce-
dure then yields an estimate of 150,000 slaves from Country C and 50,000
each from Countries D and E. In practice, these calculation are performed
separately for each slave trade. As well, because slaves were increasingly
taken from further inland as each slave trade progressed, the calculations
are also performed separately for each of the following time periods: 1400-
1599, 1600-1699, 1700-1799, 1800-1900.4
3In instances where an ethnicity is located in more than one country, I map the ethnicity
into the multiple countries using land area as weights. This is explained in detail in Nunn
[2007].
4See Nunn [2007] for all of the finer details of the construction procedure.
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FIGURE II
Ethnic boundaries defined by Murdock [1959] and modern political boundaries
An important assumption in this procedure is that slaves shipped from a
port within a country are either from that country or from countries directly
to the interior. However, in reality, some slaves shipped from a country’s
coast may have originated from a neighboring coastal country. In Nunn
[2007], using three samples of slaves for which we know both the ethnicity
of the slaves and the port that they were shipped from, I test the validity
of this assumption and the overall accuracy of the estimation procedure. I
find that for each of the three samples my procedure correctly identifies the
origins of between 83 and 98% of the slaves in the samples.
A second source of measurement error arises because slaves from the
interior will tend to be under-represented in the ethnicity samples. This is
because only slaves that survived the voyage outside of Africa are in the
ethnicity samples. All else equal, the further inland a slave originated, the
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longer the journey was, and the more likely it was that he or she died along
the way. Because the rates of mortality during the slave trades were ex-
tremely high, this form of measurement error may be significant.5 However,
as I show formally in the Appendix, the under-sampling of slaves from the
interior results in OLS estimates that are biased towards zero. As well, one
can use instruments that are uncorrelated with the measurement error to
derive consistent estimates. I do this in Section V.B.
After the data have been constructed, I have estimates of the number
of slaves shipped from each country in Africa during each of the four slave
trades during four different time periods: 1400-1599, 1600-1699, 1700-1799,
1800-1900. Table II reports the estimated total number of slaves exported
from each country, as well as the total disaggregated by slave trade. Overall,
the estimates are consistent with the general view among African historians
of where the primary slaving areas were. During the trans-Atlantic slave
trade, slaves were taken in greatest numbers from the ‘Slave Coast’ (Benin
and Nigeria), West Central Africa (Zaire, Congo, and Angola), and the ‘Gold
Coast’ (Ghana). All of these countries appear among the top exporting
countries on the list. Ethiopia and Sudan are also among the top exporting
countries because they were the primary suppliers of slaves shipped during
the Red Sea and Saharan slave trades. The low number of slave exports from
South Africa and Namibia confirms the view of African historians that these
areas exported “virtually no slaves” [Manning, 1983, p. 839]. The relative
magnitudes of exports from geographically close countries are also consistent
with the qualitative evidence from the African history literature. Manning
[1983, p. 839] writes that “some adjoining regions were quite dissimilar:
Togo exported few slaves and the Gold Coast many; Gabon exported few
slaves, and the Congo exported many.” The estimates are consistent with
Manning’s observation. Exports from Togo are far less than from Ghana,
and exports from Gabon are less than from the Republic of Congo.
IV. Basic Correlations: OLS Estimates
I begin by examining the relationship between past slave exports and
current economic performance. I normalize the total number of slaves taken
from each country by its size, measured by land area.6 Figure III shows the
5Estimates of cross-Atlantic mortality rates ranged from 7 to 20% depending on the
time period and the length of the voyage [Curtin, 1969, pp. 275–286; Lovejoy, 2000, p.
63]. Death rates during the trek to the coast are known with less certainty, but estimates
range from 10 to 50% [Lovejoy, 2000, pp. 63–64; Vansina, 1990, p. 218].
6Alternative measures of country size are also possible. As I show in Table VI in
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TABLE II
Estimated total slave exports between 1400 and 1900 by country
Trans- Indian Trans- Red All slave
Isocode Country name Atlantic Ocean Saharan Sea trades
AGO Angola 3,607,020 0 0 0 3,607,020
NGA Nigeria 1,406,728 0 555,796 59,337 2,021,859
GHA Ghana 1,614,793 0 0 0 1,614,793
ETH Ethiopia 0 200 813,899 633,357 1,447,455
SDN Sudan 615 174 408,261 454,913 863,962
MLI Mali 331,748 0 509,950 0 841,697
ZAR Dem Rep of Congo 759,468 7,047 0 0 766,515
MOZ Mozambique 382,378 243,484 0 0 625,862
TZA Tanzania 10,834 523,992 0 0 534,826
TCD Chad 823 0 409,368 118,673 528,862
BEN Benin 456,583 0 0 0 456,583
SEN Senegal 278,195 0 98,731 0 376,926
GIN Guinea 350,149 0 0 0 350,149
TGO Togo 289,634 0 0 0 289,634
GNB Guinea-Bissau 180,752 0 0 0 180,752
BFA Burkina Faso 167,201 0 0 0 167,201
MRT Mauritania 417 0 164,017 0 164,434
MWI Malawi 88,061 37,370 0 0 125,431
MDG Madagascar 36,349 88,927 0 0 125,275
COG Congo 94,663 0 0 0 94,663
KEN Kenya 303 12,306 60,351 13,490 86,448
SLE Sierra Leone 69,607 0 0 0 69,607
CMR Cameroon 66,719 0 0 0 66,719
DZA Algeria 0 0 61,835 0 61,835
CIV Ivory Coast 52,646 0 0 0 52,646
SOM Somalia 0 229 26,194 5,855 32,277
ZMB Zambia 6,552 21,406 0 0 27,958
GAB Gabon 27,403 0 0 0 27,403
GMB Gambia 16,039 0 5,693 0 21,731
NER Niger 133 0 0 19,779 19,912
LBY Libya 0 0 8,848 0 8,848
LBR Liberia 6,790 0 0 0 6,790
UGA Uganda 900 3,654 0 0 4,554
ZAF South Africa 1,944 87 0 0 2,031
CAF Cen African Republic 2,010 0 0 0 2,010
EGY Egypt 0 0 1,492 0 1,492
ZWE Zimbabwe 554 536 0 0 1,089
NAM Namibia 191 0 0 0 191
BDI Burundi 0 87 0 0 87
GNQ Equatorial Guinea 11 0 0 0 11
DJI Djibouti 0 5 0 0 5
BWA Botswana 0 0 0 0 0
CPV Cape Verde Islands 0 0 0 0 0
COM Comoros 0 0 0 0 0
LSO Lesotho 0 0 0 0 0
MUS Mauritius 0 0 0 0 0
MAR Morocco 0 0 0 0 0
RWA Rwanda 0 0 0 0 0
STP Sao Tome & Principe 0 0 0 0 0
SWZ Swaziland 0 0 0 0 0
SYC Seychelles 0 0 0 0 0
TUN Tunisia 0 0 0 0 0
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FIGURE III
Relationship between log slave exports normalized by land area,
ln(exports/area), and log real per capita GDP in 2000, ln y
relationship between the natural log of the number of slaves exported in all
four slave trades between 1400 and 1900 normalized by land area, and the
natural log of per capita GDP in 2000.7 As shown in the figure, a negative
relationship between income and slave exports is apparent in the raw data.
I further examine this relationship by controlling for other country char-
acteristics that are also potentially important for current income. My base-
line estimating equation is:
(1) ln yi = β0 + β1 ln(exportsi/areai) +C
′
iδ +X
′
iγ + εi,
where ln yi is the natural log of real per capita GDP in country i in 2000, and
ln(exportsi/areai) is the natural log of the total number of slaves exported
between 1400 and 1900 normalized by land area. Per capita GDP data are
for the year 2000 and are from Maddison [2003]. Ci is a vector of dummy
the appendix, using the average population of a country between 1400 and 1900 yields
nearly identical results. Similarly, using arable land area rather than land area also yields
essentially identical results.
7Because the natural log of zero is undefined, I take the natural log of .1. As I show in
the appendix, the results are robust to the omission of these zero export countries.
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variables that indicate the origin of the colonizer prior to independence.
These are included to control for the other significant event in Africa’s past,
colonial rule. Xi is a vector of control variables that are meant to capture
differences in countries’ geography and climate.
OLS estimates of (1) are reported in Table III. The first column reports
estimates of (1) with colonizer fixed effects only. In the second column, I also
include controls that capture the potential importance of geography for long
term economic development: distance from the equator, longitude, minimum
monthly rainfall, average maximum humidity, average minimum tempera-
ture, and proximity to the ocean measured by the natural log of coastline
divided by land area. All factors, except longitude, influence whether a coun-
try has a tropical climate, which affects the prevalence of infectious disease
and agricultural productivity [Kamarck, 1976; Sachs et al., 2001]. Longitude
is also included to capture differences between the Eastern andWestern parts
of the African continent.8 In both specifications, the estimated relationship
between slave exports and per capita income are negative and statistically
significant.
One concern with the estimates in columns 1 and 2 is that they may be
biased because of the inclusion of small islands and North African countries
in the sample. In column 3, I omit island and North African countries,
dropping Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Seychelles, Mauritius,
Comoros, Sao Tome and Principe, and the Cape Verde Islands. As shown,
dropping these countries makes little difference. The estimated coefficient
for slave exports remains negative and significant, and the magnitude of the
estimated coefficient actually increases.9
In column 4, I include additional control variables to account for poten-
tial differences between islands or North African countries and the rest of
Africa. Two core differences between North Africa and the rest of Africa is
that North African countries are predominantly Islamic and that they all
have legal systems based on French civil law. To capture these differences,
I also include a measure of the percent of the population that is islamic
and a French legal origin indicator variable. I also include a North Africa
8A related concern is that the slave exports variable may simply capture a West Africa
fixed effect. I show in the appendix that the results are robust to also controlling for
region fixed effects.
9One may also be concerned that the inclusion of the countries in Southern Africa
– namely South Africa, Swaziland, and Lesotho – may also be biasing the results. As I
report in the appendix, the results are robust to also omitting this group of countries. The
table also shows that the estimates are robust to the omission of potentially influential
observations.
15
TABLE III
Relationship between slave exports and income
Dependent variable is log real per capita GDP in 2000, ln y
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(exports/area) −.112∗∗∗ −.076∗∗∗ −.108∗∗∗ −.085∗∗ −.103∗∗∗ −.128∗∗∗
(.024) (.029) (.037) (.035) (.034) (.034)
Distance from equator .016 −.005 .019 .023 .006
(.017) (.020) (.018) (.017) (.017)
Longitude .001 −.007 −.004 −.004 −.009
(.005) (.006) (.006) (.005) (.006)
Lowest monthly rainfall −.001 .008 .0001 −.001 −.002
(.007) (.008) (.007) (.006) (.008)
Avg max humidity .009 .008 .009 .015 .013
(.012) (.012) (.012) (.011) (.010)
Avg min temperature −.019 −.039 −.005 −.015 −.037
(.028) (.028) (.027) (.026) (.025)
ln(coastline/area) .085∗∗ .092∗∗ .095∗∗ .082∗∗ .083∗∗
(.039) (.042) (.042) (.040) (.037)
Island indicator −.398 −.150
(.529) (.516)
Percent Islamic −.008∗∗∗ −.006∗ −.003
(.003) (.003) (.003)
French legal origin .755 .643 −.141
(.503) (.470) (.734)
North Africa indicator .382 −.304
(.484) (.517)
ln(gold prod/pop) .011 .014
(.017) (.015)
ln(oil prod/pop) .078∗∗∗ .088∗∗∗
(.027) (.025)
ln(diamond prod/pop) −.039 −.048
(.043) (.041)
Colonizer fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number obs. 52 52 42 52 52 42
R2 .51 .60 .63 .71 .77 .80
OLS estimates of (1) are reported. The dependent variable is the natural log of real per
capita GDP in 2000, ln y. The slave export variable ln(exports/area) is the natural log of the
total number of slaves exported from each country between 1400 and 1900 in the four slave trades
normalized by land area. The colonizer fixed effects are indicator variables for the identity of the
colonizer at the time of independence. Coefficients are reported with standard errors in brackets.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.
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fixed effect and an island fixed effect. As shown, including these additional
control variables does not affect the slave exports coefficient, which remains
negative and statistically significant.
The final factor that I control for are differences in countries endowments
of natural resources. In column 5, I also control for the natural log of
annual average per capita production between 1970 and 2000 of gold, oil,
and diamonds. As shown, controlling for countries’ production of these
natural resources does not alter the results.10 In column 6, I simultaneously
include all control variables and drop islands and North African countries
from the sample. Again the results remain robust.11
The estimated magnitudes of the relationship between slave exports and
income are not only statistically significant but also economically mean-
ingful. Calculating the standardized beta coefficients of the estimates, one
finds that a one standard deviation increase in ln(exports/area) is associ-
ated with between .36 to .62 standard deviation decrease in log income. If
for purely illustrative purposes one interprets the OLS estimates as causal,
then according to the estimate from column 5, for a country initially with
the mean level of income of $1,249, a one standard deviation decrease in the
slave export variable will raise income to $1,864, which is a 50% increase in
income.
V. Econometric Issues: Causality and Measurement Error
Although the OLS estimates show that there is a relationship between
slave exports and current economic performance, it remains unclear whether
the slave trades have a causal impact on current income. An alternative
explanation for the relationship is that societies that were initially under-
developed selected into the slave trades, and these societies continue to be
underdeveloped today. Therefore, we observe a negative relationship be-
tween slave exports and current income, even though the slave trades did
not have any effect on subsequent economic development. In this section, I
pursue two strategies to evaluate whether there is causal effect of the slave
trades on income. First, using historic data and qualitative evidence from
African historians, I evaluate the importance and characteristics of selection
10Looking at Figure III one can see that Equatorial Guinea (GNQ), which has a low
value of slave exports and has recently witness extremely rapid economic growth because of
the discovery of large offshore oil reserves, is a potential outlier. As I show in the appendix,
the results are also robust to the omission of Equatorial Guinea from the sample.
11The island and North Africa indicator variables drop out of the equation when island
and North African countries are omitted from the sample.
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into the slave trades. As I will show, the evidence suggests that selection was
important, but it was usually the societies that were the most prosperous,
not the most underdeveloped, that selected into the slave trades. Given this
evidence, it is unlikely that the strong relationship between slave exports
and current income is driven by selection. Instead, selection will tend to
bias the OLS estimates towards zero. Second, I use the distance from each
country to the location of the demand for slaves as instruments for slave
exports. The IV results confirm the OLS estimates.
V.A. Historical Evidence on Selection during the Slave Trades
A large proportion of the early trade between Africans and Europeans
was in commodities other than slaves. During this time, only societies with
institutions that were sufficiently developed were able to facilitate trade
with the Europeans. Between 1472 and 1483, the Portuguese sailed south
along the West coast of Africa, testing various points of entry looking for
trading partners. They were unable to find any societies north of the Zaire
river that could support trade. Vansina [1990, p. 200] writes that “the
local coastal societies were just too small in terms of people and territory;
their economic and social institutions were too undifferentiated to facilitate
foreign trade.” Sustained trade did not occur until the Portuguese found
the Kongo Kingdom, located just south of the Zaire river. Because the
Kongo Kingdom had a centralized government, national currency, and well-
developed markets and trading networks, it was able to support trade with
the Europeans.
When European demand turned almost exclusively to slaves, the prefer-
ence to trade with the most developed parts of Africa continued. Because
the more prosperous areas were also the most densely populated, large num-
bers of slaves could be efficiently obtained if civil wars or conflicts could be
instigated [Barry, 1992; Inikori, 2003]. As well, societies that were the most
violent and hostile, and therefore least developed, were often best able to
resist European efforts to purchase slaves. For example, the slave trade in
Gabon was limited because of the defiance and violence of its inhabitants
towards the Portuguese. This resistance continued for centuries, and as a
result the Portuguese were forced to concentrate their efforts along the coast
further south [Hall, 2005, pp. 60–64].
Using data on initial population densities, I check whether it was the
more prosperous or less prosperous areas that selected into the slave trades.
Acemoglu et al. [2002] have shown that population density is a reasonable
indicator of economic prosperity. Figure IV shows the relationship between
18
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FIGURE IV
Relationship between initial population density and slave exports
the natural log of population density in 1400 and ln(exports/area). The
data confirm the historical evidence on selection during the slave trades.12
The figure shows that the parts of Africa that were the most prosperous in
1400, measured by population density, tend to also be the areas that were
most impacted by the slave trades.
A second potential source of selection may be that societies that ini-
tially had domestic slavery may have selected into the slave trades. If this
is the case, then the estimates may be biased by a negative relationship
between domestic slavery and subsequent economic development, similar to
that documented by Engerman and Sokoloff [1997, 2002] in the Americas.
The historic evidence indicates that in the areas of Africa that were part
of the older Islamic slave trades there was domestic slavery, but it is unclear
whether domestic slavery was a cause or a consequence of the external slave
trades. Whether the parts of Africa that were untouched by the Islamic
trades had chattel slavery prior to European contact has been the subject
of an old debate among African historians [e.g., Fage, 1962; Rodney, 1970].
12The relationship is similar if one excludes island and North African countries, or if
one normalizes slave exports by population rather than land area.
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Since this debate evidence has been brought forth suggesting that domestic
slavery may not have existed prior to the trans-Atlantic slave trade. Hilton
[1985] provides evidence showing that in the sixteenth century, words that
originally meant ‘servant’ or ‘prisoner’ were altered to take on the meaning
of a ‘traded slave’. Historian and Anthropologist Jan Vansina [1989], using
more detailed linguistic data, confirms Hilton’s finding, showing that in West
Central Africa there was no word for slave. Vansina maps the origin of the
word ‘pika’ which originally meant servant, but took on the meaning of a
‘traded slave’. The word originated at the coastal ports engaged in the slave
trade and spread to the inland communities that were also involved in the
trade [Vansina, 1989, 1990]. Recent studies of other regions also suggest
that prior to the external slave trade domestic slavery did not exist [e.g.,
Harms, 1981; Inikori, 2000; Hall, 2005, p. 16].
V.B. Instrumental Variables
The second strategy that I pursue is to use instruments that are corre-
lated with slave exports, but are uncorrelated with other country character-
istics. This strategy has the added benefit of yielding potentially consistent
estimates even though slave exports are measured with error. If the instru-
ments are also uncorrelated with the measurement error in slave exports
that arises from the under-sampling of slaves from the interior, then unlike
OLS, IV yields consistent estimates.
As instruments for slave exports, I use the distances from each African
country to the locations of where slaves were demanded. The validity of the
instruments relies on the presumption that although the location of demand
influenced the location of supply, the location of supply did not influence
the location of demand. If sugar plantations were established in the West
Indies because the West Indies were close to the western coast of Africa,
then the instruments are not valid. However, if instead many slaves were
taken from Western Africa because it is relatively close to the plantation
economies in the West Indies, then the instruments are potentially valid.
According to the known history the slave trades, it was the location of
demand that influenced the location of supply and not vice versa. The
location of the demand for African slaves was determined by a number of
factors, all unrelated to the supply of slaves. In the West Indies and the
Southern United States, slaves were imported because of climates suitable
for growing highly valued, globally traded commodities such as sugar and
tobacco. The existence of gold and silver mines was a determinant of the
demand for slaves in Brazil. In the Northern Sahara, Arabia and Persia,
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slaves were needed to work in salt mines, and in the Red Sea area slaves
were used as pearl divers.
The instruments measure the distance from each country to the most
important destinations in each of the slave trades. The four instruments
are:
1. The sailing distance from the point on the coast that is closest to the
country’s centroid to the closest major market of the Atlantic slave
trade. I use the nine largest importers of slaves, which are: Virginia,
USA; Havana, Cuba; Haiti; Kingston, Jamaica; Dominica; Martinique;
Guyana; Salvador, Brazil; and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.13
2. The sailing distance from the point on the coast that is closest to the
country’s centroid to the closest of the two major slave destinations of
the Indian Ocean slave trade: Mauritius and Muscat, Oman.
3. The overland distance from a country’s centroid to the closest port of
export for the trans-Saharan slave trade. The markets are: Algiers,
Tunis, Tripoli, Benghazi and Cairo.
4. The overland distance from a country’s centroid to the closest port of
export for the Red Sea slave trade. The ports are: Massawa, Suakin,
and Djibouti.14
The instruments are illustrated in Figure V, which shows the four dis-
tances for Burkina Faso. The ports in each of the four slave trades are
represented by different colored symbols, and the shortest distances by col-
ored lines. Details of the construction of the instruments are given in the
appendix.15
The IV estimates are reported in Table IV. The first column reports
estimates without control variables, the second column includes colonizer
fixed effects, and the third and fourth columns include colonizer fixed effects
13Data on slave imports are from Eltis and Richardson [forthcoming]. There is a sig-
nificant drop in the volume of slave imports between the 9th and 10th largest markets.
Because of this natural break, I use the top 9 markets.
14For island countries, one cannot reach the ports of the Saharan or Red Sea slave
trades by traveling overland. For these countries I use the sum of the sailing distance and
overland distance.
15An alternative strategy is to also include the distance from the centroid to the coast
(which is also shown in Figure V) as an additional instrument since this distance is part of
the total distance to the markets in the Indian Ocean and trans-Atlantic slave trades. The
results are essentially identical if this distance is also included as an additional instrument.
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FIGURE V
Example showing the distance instruments for Burkina Faso
and geography controls. In column 4, the sample excludes islands and North
African countries.
The first stage estimates are reported in the bottom panel of the table.
The coefficients for the instruments are generally negative, suggesting that
the further a country was from slave markets, the less slaves it exported.16
The exception is the distance from the Red Sea ports, which is never signif-
icant, and even positive in one specification.
The second stage estimates are reported in the top panel. Because the
first stage F -statistics are low, I also report conditional likelihood ratio
(CLR) confidence intervals. The estimates for ln(exports/area) are all neg-
ative and statistically significant. In column 3, the confidence interval is
unbounded, which is a consequence of the low first stage F -statistic. The
point estimates range from −.20 to −.28. These magnitude are significantly
larger than the magnitudes of the OLS estimates. This is not surprising
since the measurement error in the slave export estimates and the selec-
16The specifications assume a linear first stage relationship. The estimates are similar
if one also allows for a non-linear relationship between slave exports and the distance
instruments. The results are also similar if one uses the average or median distance to the
ports in each trade, rather than the minimum distance.
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tion of the initially most prosperous societies into the slave trades are both
expected to bias the OLS estimates towards zero.
A potential concern with the IV estimates is that the distances to the
slave markets may be correlated with distances to other locations, which are
important for economic development. The likelihood of this can be assessed
by estimating the reduced form relationship between the distance instru-
ments and income within Africa and outside of Africa.17 I find that within
Africa, the four distance instruments are positively correlated with income,
and all coefficients, except for the Red Sea coefficient, are highly significant.
Begin further from slave markets was good for growth. However, outside of
Africa, there is no clear relationship between the distance instruments and
income. If the results of Table IV are driven by the relationship between the
distances to slave markets and distances to other locations, then one would
expect to also observe a positive relationship between the distance measures
and income outside of Africa. However, this is not the case.
Overall, the IV results confirm the negative relationship between slave
exports and income estimated by OLS. They also suggest that the OLS
estimates may even be a lower bound estimate of the strength of the slave
trade-income relationship.
VI. Possible Channels of Causality
I now turn to the channels through which the slave trades may have
affected economic development. I view this analysis as preliminary and ex-
ploratory. With only 52 observations it is not possible to pin down the pre-
cise channels and mechanism underlying the relationships with any reason-
able degree of certainty. My strategy here is to simply investigate whether
the data are consistent with the historic events described Section II.
An important consequence of the slave trades was that they tended to
weaken ties between villages, thus discouraging the formation of larger com-
munities and broader ethnic identities. I explore whether the data are consis-
tent with this channel by examining the relationship between slave exports
and a measure of current ethnic fractionalization from Alesina et al. [2003].
As shown in Figure VI, there is a strong positive relationship between the
two variables.18 This is consistent with the historic accounts of the slave
trades impeding the formation of broader ethnic identities.
This consequence of the slave trades is important because of the increas-
ing evidence showing that ethnic fractionalization is an important deter-
17I thank Ted Miguel for suggesting this check.
18The results are also similar if other measures of ethnic fractionalization are used.
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TABLE IV
IV estimates of the relationship between slave exports and income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Second Stage. Dependent variable is log income in 2000, ln y
ln(exports/area) −.208∗∗∗ −.201∗∗∗ −.284∗ −.248∗∗∗
(.053) (.047) (.148) (.071)
[−.51,−.14] [−.42,−.13] [−∞,+∞] [−.62,−.12]
Colonizer fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Geography controls No No Yes Yes
Restricted sample No No No Yes
F -stat 15.4 4.32 1.73 2.17
Number obs. 52 52 52 42
First Stage. Dependent variable is slave exports, ln(exports/area)
Atlantic distance −1.31∗∗∗ −1.74∗∗∗ −1.32∗ −1.69∗∗
(.357) (.425) (.761) (.680)
Indian distance −1.10∗∗∗ −1.43∗∗∗ −1.08 −1.57∗
(.380) (.531) (.697) (.801)
Saharan distance −2.43∗∗∗ −3.00∗∗∗ −1.14 −4.08∗∗
(.823) (1.05) (1.59) (1.55)
Red Sea distance −.002 −.152 −1.22 2.13
(.710) (.813) (1.82) (2.40)
F -stat 4.55 2.38 1.82 4.01
Colonizer fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Geography controls No No Yes Yes
Restricted sample No No No Yes
Hausman test (p-value) .02 .01 .02 .04
Sargan test (p-value) .18 .30 .65 .51
IV estimates of (1) are reported. Slave exports ln(exports/area) is the natural
log of the total number of slaves exported from each country between 1400 and 1900
in the four slave trades normalized by land area. The colonizer fixed effects are
indicator variables for the identity of the colonizer at the time of independence.
Coefficients are reported, with standard errors in brackets. For the endogenous
variable ln(exports/area), I also report 95 percent confidence regions based on
Moreira’s [2003] conditional likelihood ratio (CLR) approach. These are reported
in square brackets. The p-value of the Hausman test is for the Wu-Hausman
chi-squared test. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent
levels. The ‘restricted sample’ excludes island and North African countries. The
‘geography controls’ are: distance from equator, longitude, lowest monthly rainfall,
avg max humidity, avg min temperature, and ln(coastline/area).
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FIGURE VI
Relationship between slave exports and current ethnic fractionalization
minant of a variety of factors necessary for economic development. Since
the seminal article documenting the link between ethnic diversity and eco-
nomic growth by Easterly and Levine [1997], subsequent research by La
Porta et al. [1999], Alesina et al. [2003], Aghion et al. [2004], and Easterly
et al. [2006] looks more deeply into why ethnic fractionalization is important
for development. These studies find that ethnic diversity is important for
social cohesion, domestic institutions, domestic polices, and the quality of
government. As well, Alesina et al. [1999], Miguel and Gugerty [2005], and
Banerjee and Somanathan [2006] find that ethnic fractionalization reduces
the provision of public goods, such as education, health facilities, access
to water, and transportation infrastructure, all of which are important for
economic development.
A second, and closely related, consequence of the slave trades was the
weakening and underdevelopment of states. To examine whether the data
are consistent with this channel, I consider the relationship between slave ex-
ports and the level of state development following the slave trades. To do this
I use a measure of pre-colonial state development from Gennaioli and Rainer
[2006]. The measure is constructed using ethnographic data from Murdock
[1967] on the indigenous political complexity of ethnic groups, measured by
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FIGURE VII
Relationship between slave exports and 19th century state development
the number of jurisdictional hierarchies beyond the local community. The
original measure ranges from 0 to 4, with 0 indicating “stateless” societies
and 4 indicating societies with “large states” [Murdock, 1967, p. 52]. Using
this data, Gennaioli and Rainer [2006] construct a measure of the proportion
of a country’s indigenous population that belongs to an ethnic group that
falls into category 2, 3, or 4.
The relationship between slave exports and 19th century state devel-
opment is shown in Figure VII. The negative relationship between slave
exports and state centralization shown in the figure is consistent with the
historic accounts of the slave trades causing long-term political instability,
which resulted in weakened and fragmented states.
Recent empirical research shows that a country’s history of state de-
velopment is an important determinant of current economic performance.
Bockstette et al. [2002] and Chanda and Putterman [2005] find that ‘state
antiquity’, measured using an index of the depth of experience with state-
level institutions, is positively correlated with real per capita GDP growth
between 1960 and 1995. Looking within Africa, Gennaioli and Rainer [2006]
find that countries with ethnicities that had centralized pre-colonial state
institutions today provide more public goods, such as education, health, and
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Paths of economic development since 1950
infrastructure.
Herbst [1997, 2000] also focuses on the importance of state development
for economic success, arguing that Africa’s poor economic performance is a
result of post-colonial state failure, the roots of which lie in the underde-
velopment and instability of pre-colonial polities. Herbst [2000, chpt. 2–4]
argues that because of a lack of significant political development during
colonial rule, the limited pre-colonial political structures continued to exist
after independence.19 As a result, Africa’s post-independence leaders inher-
ited nation states that did not have the infrastructure necessary to extend
authority and control over the whole country. Many states were, and still
are, unable to collect taxes from its citizens, and as a result they are also
unable to provide a minimum level of public goods and services.
A corollary of Herbst’s argument is that the impact of the slave trades
may have been felt most strongly after colonial independence. This is be-
cause this is when pre-colonial political structures suddenly increased in im-
portance, as they became central determinants of the success of the newly
19On the continuity between Africa’s pre-colonial and post-colonial political systems
also see Hargreaves [1969, p. 200].
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formed state. Using Figure VIII, I examine whether the evolution of in-
comes since 1950 is consistent with this hypothesis. The figure shows av-
erage per capita GDP between 1950 and 2000 for two groups of African
countries.20 One group consists of the 26 countries with the lowest mea-
sures of ln(exports/area) and the other is the 26 countries with the highest
measures of ln(exports/area). As shown in the figure, throughout the pe-
riod low slave export countries are richer on average than high slave export
countries. Also interesting, however, is the difference in the evolution of
income between the two groups of countries. Although the low slave export
countries were richer in the early 1950s when most countries were still under
colonial rule, the income gap between the two groups increased significantly
over time, and became most pronounced after the late 1960s and early 1970s
when most countries had gained independence.21 This pattern is consistent
with the slave trades affecting early state development, which may have
mattered during colonial rule, but mattered much more after independence.
Because those parts of Africa that were most severely impacted by the slave
trades tended to have the least developed political systems, after indepen-
dence these countries continued to have weak and unstable states, as well
as slower economic growth.
VII. Conclusions
Combining data from shipping records and data from historical docu-
ments reporting slave ethnicities, I have constructed estimates of the num-
ber of slaves exported from each country in Africa during Africa’s four slave
trades. I found a robust negative relationship between the number of slaves
taken from a country and its subsequent economic development.
I pursued a number of strategies to better understand if the relation-
ship is causal or spurious. If countries that were initially underdeveloped
selected into the slave trades, and if these countries continue to be under-
developed today, then this may explain the observed relationship between
slave exports and current income. I first reviewed the historical evidence on
the characteristics of African societies that were most affected by the slave
trades. The qualitative and quantitative evidence show that it was actually
the most developed parts of Africa, not the least developed, that tended
20The averages are weighted by each country’s population in 2000.
21In 1950 only four African countries were independent. Ethiopia had never been col-
onized, and Liberia, South Africa, and Egypt had previously gained independence. By
1969, 42 of Africa’s 52 countries had gained independence, and by 1976 48 countries were
independent.
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to select into the slave trades. I also used the distances from each country
to the locations of the demand for slaves as instruments to estimate the
causal effect of the slave trades on economic development. The IV estimates
confirmed the OLS results, suggesting that increased extraction during the
slave trades resulted in worse economic performance.
I then examined the channels of causality underlying the relationship
between slave exports and economic development. I showed that the data are
consistent with historic accounts suggesting that the slave trades impeded
the formation of broader ethnic groups, leading to ethnic fractionalization,
and that the slave trades resulted in a weakening and underdevelopment of
political structures.
Appendix
A. Deriving the Bias from the Under-Sampling of Slaves from the Interior
In this section I show that the under-sampling of slaves from the interior
of Africa will result in OLS estimates of the effect of slave exports on income
that are biased towards zero. To see this, denote the true number of slaves
taken from country i by s∗i , the observed number of slaves by si, distance to
the coast by di, and economic development by yi. All variables are expressed
as deviations from means. Assume the true relationship between the number
of slaves exported and distance to the coast is given by
(2) s∗i = −αdi + εi,
where α > 0 and εi is i.i.d. drawn from a normal distribution. The relation-
ship between the observed number of slaves exported si and the distance to
the coast di is given by
(3) si = s
∗
i − γdi + νi,
where γ > 0 and νi is uncorrelated with εi. The true relationship between
slave exports and development is given by
(4) yi = −βs
∗
i + ωi,
where β > 0 and ωi is uncorrelated with all other variables.
If one estimates yi = bsi + ξi by OLS, then the estimated relationship
between si and yi is
(5) bˆ =
∑
i siyi∑
i s
2
i
.
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Substituting (2) into (3) gives
(6) si = −(α+ γ)di + εi + νi.
Similarly, (2) and (4) give
(7) yi = βαdi − βεi + ωi.
Substituting (6) and (7) into (5), and taking the plim of bˆ gives
(8) plim bˆ = −β
[
σ2s∗ + γασ
2
d
σ2s∗ + 2γ(α+ γ)σ
2
d + σ
2
ν
]
,
where σ2s∗ = α
2σ2d + σ
2
ε .
First, consider the case when the only source of measurement error is
classical measurement error. Then γ = 0 and (8) reduces to the standard
formula for attenuation bias: plim bˆ = −β[σ2s∗/(σ
2
s∗ + σ
2
ν)].
Next, consider the measurement error introduced by the under-sampling
of slaves from the interior. The result of this is that the under-estimation
of slave exports is increasing in a country’s distance from the coast: γ > 0.
Looking at (8), it is apparent that 2γ(α + γ) > γα and therefore the pres-
ence of non-classical measurement error also biases the estimated coefficient
towards zero, reinforcing the attenuation bias resulting from classical errors-
in-variables.
B. Data
Real per capita GDP data are from Maddison [2003]. Land area, which is
used to calculate ln(export/area), ln(coastline/area), and population density
in 1400, is measured in millions of square kilometers, and is from Parker
[1997]. Historic population figures, measured in thousands of people, are
from McEvedy and Jones [1978]. For some groups of the smaller countries,
population data are only disaggregated to a regional level. In these cases
the data are disaggregated to the country level using the distribution of
population in 1950 from the United Nations. Data on the identity of the
colonizer before independence are from the Political Regimes and Regime
Transitions in Africa, 1910–1994 data set, which is described in [Bratton
and van de Walle, 1997].
Distance from the equator is the absolute value of the latitude of each
country’s centroid, measured in degrees. Longitude is the longitude of each
countries centroid also measured in degrees. The centroid of each country
is calculated using the Centroid Utility in ArcGIS. For five countries where
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the centroid falls outside the land borders of the country (Gambia, Somalia,
Cape Verde, Mauritius and Seychelles) the point within the country closest
to the centroid is used. The location on the coast that is closest to each
country’s centroid is identified using the Proximity Utility in ArcGIS.
Lowest monthly rainfall is the average total rainfall, measured in mil-
limeters, in the driest month of the year. Average maximum humidity is
the average of the maximum afternoon humidity, measured in percent, dur-
ing the hottest month of the year. Average minimum temperature is the
lowest average monthly temperature measured in degrees Celsius. The data
are from meteorological data taken over a 30 year period and reported in
Parker [1997]. Countries’ total coastline, which is used along with land area
to calculate ln(coastline/area) is measured in thousands of kilometers, and
is from Parker [1997].
The percent Islamic variable is the percent of a country’s population
that is Islamic. The data are from Parker [1997]. Data on countries’ legal
origins are from La Porta et al. [1999]. All countries in the sample are
coded as being either British common law or French civil law countries.
Data on the production of diamonds, crude petroleum, and mined gold are
from the British Geological Survey’s World Mineral Statistics and World
Mineral Production. All three variables are measured as the natural log
of the average annual production per thousand inhabitants from 1970 to
2000. Diamonds include both gemstones and industrial diamonds and are
measured in thousands of carats. Crude Petroleum is measured in thousands
of tonnes, and mined gold is measured in kilograms.
Ethnic fractionalization is from Alesina et al. [2003]. The measure of
19th century state development is from Gennaioli and Rainer [2006].
When taking the natural log of variables that may take on the value
of zero, I replace the zero observations with 1 × 10n, where n is the largest
integer value possible subject to 1×10n being less than the smallest non-zero
observation in the data.
The distance instruments measure the shortest sailing distances to the
location of demand in the trans-Atlantic and Indian Ocean slave trades,
and the shortest overland distance to the locations of demand in the Red
Sea and trans-Saharan slave trades. The distances are calculated using the
great circle distance between two locations. The formula for this is: dij =
(arccos{sin(Lai) sin(Laj)+cos(Lai) cos(Laj) cos(Loi−Loj)}×111.12)/1000,
where dij is the distance in thousands of kilometers between location i and j,
Lai is the latitude of location i in degrees, and Loi is the longitude of location
i in degrees. When calculating the sailing distances, I do not allow ships
to sail across land or through the Suez Canal, which was not completed
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until 1869. For voyages from Northern Africa in the trans-Atlantic slave
trade, I calculate the sailing distance through the Strait of Gibraltar to the
closest market in the Atlantic Ocean. For the distance from these countries
in the Indian Ocean slave trade, I calculate the sailing distance through the
Mediterranean sea, and then south around the Cape of Good Hope. When
calculating distances from East African countries during the trans-Atlantic
slave trade, and from West African countries during the Indian Ocean slave
trade, I calculate the sailing distance around the Cape of Good Hope.
Department of Economics, University of British Columbia and
the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR)
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B. Appendix Tables
TABLE V
Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std dev Min Max N
ln real per capita GDP in 2000 7.13 .83 5.38 9.27 52
ln(exports/area) 3.26 3.89 −2.30 8.82 52
ln(exports/pop) 9.26 3.68 3.91 14.4 52
Distance from equator 13.6 9.86 .2 36 52
Longitude 16.7 20.2 −24.0 57.8 52
Lowest monthly rainfall 8.87 16.1 0 69 52
Avg max humidity 71.7 11.9 35 95 52
Avg min temperature 8.75 7.49 −9.0 19 52
ln(coastline/area) −.24 3.24 −4.61 6.98 52
Island indicator .10 .30 0 1 52
Percent Islamic 35.3 39.1 0 100 52
French legal origin .65 .48 0 1 52
North Africa indicator .10 .30 0 1 52
ln(gold prod/pop) −7.48 5.66 −13.8 3.08 52
ln(oil prod/pop) −6.71 4.03 −9.21 3.24 52
ln(diamond prod/pop) −5.49 2.40 −6.91 2.19 52
Atlantic distance 7.38 3.28 3.64 16.4 52
Indian distance 6.93 4.24 .032 16.8 52
Saharan distance 3.51 1.57 .308 6.64 52
Red Sea distance 3.44 1.47 .064 6.47 52
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TABLE VI
Robustness and sensitivity checks
Specification: Coef Std Err N R2
Normalizing slave exports by average −.103∗∗∗ (.035) 52 .77
population from 1400 to 1900
Omitting zero slave export countries −.104∗∗ (.041) 41 .84
Omitting N. Africa, islands, −.140∗∗∗ (.040) 38 .70
GNQ, LSO, SWZ, and ZAF
Including five region fixed effects −.099∗∗ (.036) 52 .80
Omitting influential observations −.091∗∗∗ (.031) 42 .90
The table reports OLS estimates of (1), with the full set of control variables
from Table III included. The dependent variable is the natural log of real per
capita GDP in 2000, ln y. Each row of the table reports estimates from one
regression. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.
The ‘five region fixed effects’ in row 4 are North, West, Central, East, and South
Africa. In row 5, influential observations were omitted if Cook’s distance was
greater than 4/N , where N is the number of observations.
34
References
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, “The Colonial Origins of
Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation,” American Economic Review,
XCI (2001), 1369–1401.
———, “Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern
World Income Distribution,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXVII (2002), 1231–
1294.
Aghion, Philippe, Alberto Alesina, and Francesco Trebbi, “Endogenous Political Institu-
tions,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXIX (2004), 565–613.
Alesina, Alberto, Reza Baquir, and William Easterly, “Public Goods and Ethnic Divi-
sions,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXIV (1999), 1243–1284.
Alesina, Alberto, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, and Romain
Wacziarg, “Fractionalization,” Journal of Economic Growth, VIII (2003), 155–194.
Alpers, Edward A., “Trade, State, and Society among the Yao in the Nineteenth Century,”
The Journal of African History, X (1969), 405–420.
———, Ivory and Slaves in East Central Africa (Heinemann International, London, 1975).
Austen, Ralph A., “The Trans-Saharan Slave Trade: A Tentative Census,” in Henry A.
Gemery and Jan S. Hogendorn, eds., The Uncommon Market: Essays in the Economic
History of the Atlantic Slave Trade (Academic Press, New York, 1979), 23–75.
———, “The 19th Century Islamic Slave Trade from East Africa (Swahili and Red Sea
Coasts): A Tentative Census,” Slavery & Abolition, IX (1988), 21–44.
———, “The Mediterranean Islamic Slave Trade out of Africa: A Tentative Census,”
Slavery & Abolition, XIII (1992), 214–248.
Azevedo, Mario, “Power and Slavery in Central Africa: Chad (1890–1925),” Journal of
Negro History, LXVII (1982), 198–211.
Bairoch, Paul, Economics and World History: Myths and Paradoxes (University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1993).
Banerjee, Abhijit, and Rohini Somanathan, “The Political Economy of Public Goods:
Some Evidence from India,” (2006), mimeo.
Barry, Boubacar, “Senegambia from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century: Evolution
of the Wolof, Sereer, and ‘Tukuloor’,” in B.A. Ogot, ed., General History of Africa:
Volume 5, Africa from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century (University of California
Press, Berkeley, 1992), 262–299.
———, Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade (Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, U.K., 1998).
35
Bertocchi, Graziella, and Fabio Canova, “Did Colonization Matter for Growth? An Em-
pirical Exploration into the Historical Causes of Africa’s Underdevelopment,” European
Economic Review, XLVI (2002), 1851–1871.
Bockstette, Valeri, Areendam Chanda, and Louis Putterman, “States and Markets: The
Advantage of an Early Start,” Journal of Economic Growth, VII (2002), 347–369.
Bratton, Michael, and Nicolas van de Walle, “Political Regimes and Regime Transitions
in Africa, 1910–1994,” Technical Report 6996, ICPSR (1997).
Chanda, Areendam, and Louis Putterman, “State Effectiveness, Economic Growth, and
the Age of States,” in Matthew Lange and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, eds., States and
Development: Historical Antecedents of Stagnation and Advance (Palgrave MacMillan,
New York, 2005), 69–91.
Colson, Elizabeth, “African Society at the Time of the Scramble.” in L.H. Gann and Peter
Duignan, eds., Colonialism in Africa, 1870–1960. Volume 1: The History and Politics
of Colonialism, 1870–1914. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1969), 27–65.
Curtin, Philip D., The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census (The University of Wisconsin
Press, Madison, 1969).
Easterly, William, and Ross Levine, “Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divi-
sions,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXII (1997), 1203–1250.
Easterly, William, Jozef Ritzan, and Michael Woolcock, “Social Cohesion, Institutions,
and Growth,” Working Paper 94, Center for Global Development (2006).
Elbl, Ivana, “Volume of the Early Atlantic Slave Trade, 1450–1521,” Journal of African
History, XXXVIII (1997), 31–75.
Eltis, David, Stephen D. Behrendt, David Richardson, and Herbert S. Klein, The Trans-
Atlantic Slave Trade: A Database on CD-Rom (Cambridge University Press, New York,
1999).
Eltis, David, and David Richardson, “Missing Pieces and the Larger Picture: Some Im-
plications of the New Database,” in David Eltis and David Richardson, eds., The New
Transatlantic Slave Trade Database: Missing Pieces and Fresh Perspectives (forthcom-
ing).
Engerman, Stanley L., and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, “Factor Endowments, Institutions, and
Differential Paths of Growth Among New World Economies: A View from Economic
Historians of the United States,” in Stephen Harber, ed., How Latin America Fell
Behind (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1997), 260–304.
———, “Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of Development Among New World
Economies,” Working Paper 9259, National Bureau of Economic Research (2002).
Englebert, Pierre, “Pre-Colonial Institutions, Post-Colonial States, and Economic Devel-
opment in Tropical Africa,” Political Research Quarterly, LIII (2000a), 7–36.
36
———, “Solving the Mystery of the Africa Dummy,” World Development, XXVIII
(2000b), 1821–1835.
Fage, John D., An Introduction to the History of West Africa, 3rd ed. (Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge, 1962).
Gennaioli, Nicola, and Ilia Rainer, “The Modern Impact of Precolonial Centralization in
Africa,” (2006), mimeo, Stockholm University.
Grier, Robin M., “Colonial Legacies and Economic Growth,” Public Choice, XCVIII
(1999), 317–335.
Hall, Gwendolyn Midlo, Slavery and African Ethnicities in the Americas: Restoring the
Links (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2005).
Hargreaves, John D., “West African States and the European Conquest,” in L.H. Gann
and Peter Duignan, eds., Colonialism in Africa, 1870–1960 (Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 1969), 199–219.
Harms, Robert, River of Wealth, River of Sorrow: The Central Zaire Basin in the Era of
the Slave and Ivory Trade, 1500–1891 (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1981).
Hawthorne, Walter, “The Production of Slaves Where There was no State: The Guinea-
Bissau Region, 1450–1815,” Slavery & Abolition, XX (1999), 97–124.
———, Planting Rice and Harvesting Slaves: Transformations along the Guinea-Bissau
Coast, 1400–1900 (Heinemann, Portsmouth, NH, 2003).
Herbst, Jeffrey, “Responding to State Failure in Africa,” International Security, XXI
(1997), 120–144.
———, States and Power in Africa (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2000).
Higman, Barry W., Slave Populations of the British Caribbean, 1807–1834 (The John
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1984).
Hilton, Anne, The Kingdom of Kongo (Claredon, Oxford, 1985).
Hubbell, Andrew, “A View of the Slave Trade from the Margin: Souroudougou in the
Late Nineteenth-Century Slave Trade of the Niger Bend,” Journal of African History,
XLII (2001), 25–47.
Inikori, Joseph E., “Africa and the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade,” in Toyin Falola, ed., Africa
Volume I: African History Before 1885 (Carolina Academic Press, North Carolina,
2000), 389–412.
———, “The Struggle against the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade,” in A. Diouf, ed., Fighting
the Slave Trade: West African Strategies (Ohio University Press, Athens, Ohio, 2003),
170–198.
Isaacman, Allen F., “The Countries of the Zambezi Basin,” in J.F.A. Ajayi, ed., General
History of Africa, VI (Heinemann International, Paris, 1989), 179–210.
37
Kamarck, Andrew M., The Tropics and Economic Development (John Hopkins University
Press, Baltimore, md, 1976).
Karasch, Mary C., Slave Life in Rio de Janeiro (Princeton University Press, Princeton,
NJ, 1987).
Kimambo, I.N., “The East African Coast and Hinterland, 1845–1880,” in J.F.A. Ajayi,
ed., General History of Africa, VI (Heinneman International, Paris, 1989), 234–269.
Klein, Martin, “The Slave Trade and Decentralized Societies,” Journal of African History,
XLII (2001), 49–65.
Koelle, Sigismund Wilhelm, Polyglotta Africana; or A Comparative Vocabulary of Nearly
Three Hundred Words and Phrases, in More than One Hundred Distinct African Lan-
guages (Church Missionary House, London, 1854).
Kusimba, Chapurukha M., “Archaeology of Slavery in East Africa,” African Archaeological
Review, XXI (2004), 59–88.
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny,
“The Quality of Government,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, XV
(1999), 222–279.
Lagerlo¨f, Nils-Petter, “Geography, Institutions and Growth: The United States as a Mi-
crocosm,” (2005), mimeo, York University.
Lange, Matthew K., “British Colonial Legacies and Political Development,” World Devel-
opment, XXXII (2004), 905–922.
Lovejoy, Paul E., “Background to Rebellion: The Origins of Muslim Slaves in Bahia,”
Slavery & Abolition, XV (1994), 151–180.
———, Transformations in Slavery: A History of Slavery in Africa, Second Edition (Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2000).
Maddison, Angus, The World Economy: Historical Statistics (Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development, Paris, 2003).
Mahadi, Abdullahi, “The Aftermath of the Jiha¯d in the Central Sudan as a Major Factor in
the Volume of the Trans-Saharan Slave Trade in the Nineteenth Century,” in Elizabeth
Savage, ed., The Uncommon Market: Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic
Slave Trade (Frank Cass, London, 1992), 111–128.
Manning, Patrick, “Contours of Slavery and Social Change in Africa,” American Historical
Review, LXXXVIII (1983), 835–857.
———, Slavery and African Life (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1990).
Mbajedwe, Patrick U., “Africa and the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade,” in Toyin Falola,
ed., Africa Volume I: African History Before 1885 (Carolina Academic Press, North
Carolina, 2000), 335–358.
38
McEvedy, Colin, and Richard Jones, Atlas of World Population History (Penguin Books,
Harmondsworth, 1978).
Miguel, Edward, and Mary Kay Gugerty, “Ethnic Diversity, Social Sanctions, and Public
Goods in Kenya,” Journal of Public Economics, LXXXIX (2005), 2325–2368.
Mitchener, Kris James, and Ian W. McLean, “The Productivity of U.S. States Since 1880,”
Journal of Economic Growth, VIII (2003), 73–114.
Moreira, Marcelo J., “A Conditional Likelihood Ratio Test for Structural Models,” Econo-
metrica, LXXI (2003), 1027–1048.
Moreno Fraginals, Manuel, “Africa in Cuba: A Quantitative Analysis of the African Pop-
ulation in the Island of Cuba,” in Vera Rubin and Arthur Truden, eds., Comparative
Perspectives on Slavery in New World Plantation Societies (New York Academy of
Sciences, New York, 1977), 187–201.
Murdock, George Peter, Africa: Its Peoples and Their Cultural History (McGraw-Hill
Book Company, New York, 1959).
———, Ethnographic Atlas (University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 1967).
Northrup, David, Trade Without Rulers: Pre-Colonial Economic Development in South-
Eastern Nigeria (Claredon Press, Oxford, 1978).
Nunn, Nathan, “Data Appendix for The Long-Term Effects of Africa’s Slave Trades,”
(2007), mimeo, University of British Columbia.
Oldendorp, Christian Georg Andreas, C.G.A. Oldendorp’s History of the Mission of the
Evangelical Brethren on the Caribbean Islands of St. Thomas, St. Croix, and St. John
(Reprinted by Karoma Publishers Inc. in 1987, Ann Arbor, 1777).
Parker, Philip M., National Cultures of the World: A Statistical Reference (Greenwood
Press, London, 1997).
Rodney, Walter, A History of the Upper Guinea Coast (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1970).
Sachs, Jeffrey D., Andrew D. Mellinger, and John L. Gallup, “The Geography of Poverty
and Wealth,” Scientific American, CCLXXXIV (2001), 70–76.
Tardieu, Jean-Pierre, “Origins of the Slaves in the Lima Region in Peru (Sixteenth and
Seventeenth Centuries),” in Doudou Diene, ed., From Chains to Bonds: The Slave
Trade Revisited (2001), 43–55.
Vansina, Jan, Kingdoms of the Savanna (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1966).
———, “Deep-Down Time: Political Tradition in Central Africa,” History in Africa, XVI
(1989), 341–362.
———, Paths in the Rainforests (The University of Wisconsin Press, Wisconsin, 1990).
Wax, Darold D., “Preferences for Slaves in Colonial America,” Journal of Negro History,
LVIII (1973), 371–401.
39
